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- How Iran engineered its lengthiest internet shutdown
- Repression in the dark: why connectivity terrifies the regime
- Platforms, VPNs and the cat-and-mouse game of access
- Disinformation, AI and the “liar’s dividend” during the blackout
- Starlink, satellite links and the future of digital freedom in Iran
- Beyond terminals: direct-to-cell and new models of access
- Why did Iran impose its lengthiest internet shutdown?
- How did people in Iran stay online during the blackout?
- What role did AI and disinformation play in the shutdown?
- How does Iran’s approach compare with past shutdowns?
- Can satellite internet end government control over connectivity?
When an entire nation vanishes from the global network for days on end, you do not just lose connectivity, you lose witnesses. Iran’s lengthiest Internet Shutdown turned a modern, connected society into a controlled information void, while violence escalated out of sight.
How Iran engineered its lengthiest internet shutdown
The latest blackout did not arrive as a sudden, chaotic crash but as a carefully staged operation. After protests intensified in early January, authorities did not immediately cut every cable. They first throttled key services, disrupted international gateways and targeted mobile data, creating a sense of instability before a full Network Disruption took hold.
Telecommunication operators in Iran are either state-owned or tightly aligned with security agencies. That structure made coordinated shutdown orders easy to enforce. According to measurements by network observatories and reports such as recent tech coverage, overall connectivity at times fell to roughly one third of normal traffic. People on the ground experienced this as ghostly: some messaging tools worked for a few minutes, then vanished again without explanation.
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From blunt blackouts to “stealth” information control
Earlier crackdowns relied on blunt-force disconnection. In 2019, a week-long nationwide shutdown hid the killing of around 1,500 protesters. By contrast, the recent operation, described by researchers as a “stealth blackout” and analyzed in reports such as a detailed investigation of Iran’s blackout tactics, blended selective blocking with intermittent openings.
Some routes to foreign platforms were briefly restored, only to be cut again, while domestic services and pro-government sites stayed reachable. This gave authorities the benefits of Censorship and Government Control without the economic shock of a total halt. It also generated confusion: was the crisis ending, or was this just another phase of control?
Repression in the dark: why connectivity terrifies the regime
Each major Internet Shutdown in Iran has coincided with intense state violence. During the January uprising, witnesses described tanks entering neighborhoods and security forces firing on crowds, while connectivity dropped to historic lows. The death toll has been estimated in the thousands, with some accounts suggesting a range between 3,000 and 30,000 victims.
Authorities understand that Digital Freedom is not an abstract right but a direct threat to impunity. When protests are streamed live, shootings mapped in real time and victims named within hours, denial becomes harder. During the 1988 prison massacres, information travelled slowly through word of mouth and exile networks. Many younger Iranians only discovered those events after leaving the country, precisely because Information Access had been constrained for decades.
From citizen cameras to global accountability
Today, a single smartphone clip can change how an uprising is remembered. Iranian activists and researchers such as Mahsa Alimardani describe how online platforms have allowed systematic documentation for the first time: timestamps, geolocation, cross-referencing of gunfire sounds and tear gas clouds with satellite images.
Authorities respond with both force and narrative warfare. Any severe internet restriction signals that violence is likely to escalate. Observers noticed this pattern in 2019 and again during the lengthiest blackout, a point underlined in analyses like recent reporting on the sophistication of Iran’s shutdown tactics. Shutting down connectivity buys the regime a window in which bullets and batons operate without a global audience.
Platforms, VPNs and the cat-and-mouse game of access
Before the most recent crisis, daily life online in Iran already meant constant workarounds. Telegram once functioned almost as a parallel internet, hosting news channels, family chats, small businesses and Online Protest organizing. When authorities blocked Telegram after earlier unrest, users shifted to Instagram and WhatsApp, which then became political lifelines rather than just entertainment.
By 2022, during the Woman, Life, Freedom movement, these platforms were blocked as well. People responded by stacking VPNs and proxy tools, often installing several on each phone. When one tunnel failed, another was tested. This arms race between users and censors pushed many Iranians to become unexpectedly fluent in Cybersecurity concepts, from encrypted messaging to traffic obfuscation.
When VPNs are not enough
The regime did not stand still. Deep packet inspection and advanced filtering targeted the most popular circumvention tools. Even technically sophisticated users suddenly found their usual VPNs unreliable. A few services worked for short periods, then fell silent again, forcing families to schedule calls at unpredictable windows when the network happened to be open.
Yet even under pressure, fragments of connectivity slipped through. One activist described a surreal FaceTime audio call that went through without a VPN during a brief glitch in filtering. These accidental gaps reminded people that the global internet was still there, just out of reach, blocked by deliberate Telecommunication policy rather than technical failure.
Disinformation, AI and the “liar’s dividend” during the blackout
Network disruptions do not only silence citizens; they also create the perfect environment for contested narratives. Iran’s information sphere has long been shaped by competing powers, from the 1953 coup backed by Western intelligence services to joint operations with Russia and Syria during the Syrian civil war.
During the 2025 war with Israel, realistic generative video tools were already common. Both sides flooded social networks with fabricated or edited clips. One widely shared video appeared to show Israeli forces bombing Evin Prison to free political detainees. Investigations later indicated the footage was AI-manipulated content, amplifying a storyline about surgical strikes and liberation while obscuring the real civilian toll.
How AI blurs the line between proof and propaganda
The same dynamic now affects protest documentation. When a low-resolution video from a Tehran high-rise captured a lone demonstrator facing armed motorbike units, analysts used enhancement tools that introduced visible AI artifacts. Pro-government accounts immediately claimed the entire scene was fabricated “AI slop”, dismissing a verified act of courage as foreign propaganda.
This tactic exemplifies the “liar’s dividend”: the more people know that deepfakes exist, the easier it becomes for authorities to deny genuine evidence. According to researchers interviewed in pieces such as recent academic analyses of Iran’s digital control systems, the regime also plays on foreign solidarity narratives. Videos of protesters attacking mosques are reframed as pure Islamophobia, omitting the local reality that many mosques host Basij paramilitary units.
Starlink, satellite links and the future of digital freedom in Iran
When the blackout reached its peak and conventional infrastructure was effectively sealed, a different technology kept a narrow window open. Smuggled Starlink terminals, bought at prices reaching several thousand dollars on informal markets, became shared lifelines. Entire neighborhoods reportedly queued to send short messages, upload video files and confirm who was still alive.
Documentation groups relied heavily on these satellite links. They collected footage, cross-checked witness accounts and tried to map where violence was most intense. Yet the access remained deeply unequal. Marginalized regions such as Kurdistan or Sistan and Baluchestan, already facing harsher repression and deeper poverty, had far fewer terminals. Their suffering risked being underrepresented again, simply because the hardware never reached them.
Beyond terminals: direct-to-cell and new models of access
Satellite connectivity raises a strategic question: who controls the gateway when a state misuses its Telecommunication monopoly? Activists and policy groups argue that hardware-based services are helpful but cannot scale fast enough or widely enough. A promising alternative is “direct-to-cell” technology, where ordinary smartphones manufactured since around 2020 can connect directly to satellites without ground terminals.
Campaigns like Direct 2 Cell aim to turn this concept from prototype into deployable infrastructure. The goal is not to bypass local networks for everyday use but to ensure that during extreme Censorship or mass violence, people retain a basic right to communicate. For Iran’s protesters, that would mean fewer dark gaps where atrocities can unfold without witnesses, and more resilience against the next, possibly longer Internet Shutdown.
- Documenting abuses through citizen video and secure uploads
- Coordinating humanitarian support when ground lines fail
- Maintaining contact between families separated by conflict
- Providing journalists and researchers with verifiable evidence
- Offering protesters safer channels than monitored domestic apps
Why did Iran impose its lengthiest internet shutdown?
Authorities aimed to limit protest coordination, reduce the visibility of security force violence and regain narrative control. By cutting or throttling connectivity, the state weakened real-time documentation, slowed information flows to the outside world and created space for harsh crackdowns under reduced public scrutiny.
How did people in Iran stay online during the blackout?
Many relied on multiple VPNs, circumvention tools and occasional routing glitches that briefly restored access. A smaller, wealthier segment used smuggled Starlink terminals to connect via satellite. These terminals often served entire neighborhoods but remained scarce, leaving many regions almost completely disconnected.
What role did AI and disinformation play in the shutdown?
The blackout created fertile ground for manipulated content and denial of authentic evidence. Both state and foreign actors used AI-generated or edited videos to push competing narratives. At the same time, authorities exploited awareness of deepfakes to dismiss genuine protest footage as fabricated, undermining trust in visual proof.
How does Iran’s approach compare with past shutdowns?
Earlier shutdowns, such as the 2019 week-long blackout, used blunt nationwide disconnections. The recent operation combined targeted blocking, throttling and selective access in a more calibrated way. Analysts describe this as a shift toward a sophisticated, long-term strategy of digital isolation and layered information control.
Can satellite internet end government control over connectivity?
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Satellite services reduce dependence on national infrastructure but do not automatically guarantee universal access. High costs, import restrictions and targeted repression limit their reach. However, broader deployment of technologies like direct-to-cell satellite links could significantly weaken monopolies over connectivity and strengthen digital freedom during future crises.
